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Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Saudi
Arabia v. Nelson: A Practical Guide
By DANNY A. HOEK*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution explicitly grants the judiciary
branch the power to resolve controversies between United States citi-
zens and foreign governments.' The Constitution also grants power
over general foreign relations issues to the executive branch3z Despite
the potential for judicial decisions to interfere with executive foreign
policy, guidelines for resolving any disputes or inconsistencies are not
addressed in the Constitution. This omission has resulted in uncer-
tainty that continues to this day.
The Constitutional division of authority was not a major issue in
the early republic. The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity
allowed courts to refuse to rule upon any potentially disruptive situa-
tions. Traditionally, most international issues fell clearly within the
executive power over military conflict and foreign diplomacy.3 How-
ever, as governments expanded the breadth of their activities, ventur-
ing into areas previously occupied only by private commercial
concerns, the line distinguishing private and public entities became in-
creasingly blurred. As a result, the United States court system was
pressured to allow plaintiffs to pursue grievances against foreign gov-
ernments, particularly in cases of issues too insignificant to warrant
action by the executive branch. Tension has developed over which
branch of government should take precedence when potential con-
flicts arise.
In 1976, the United States Congress attempted to alleviate the
tension between the executive and judicial branches. In enacting the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA),4 Congress in-
tended to establish clear standards by which courts could resolve
* Member of the Class of 1995. B.A. University of Oregon, 1992.
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, d. 1.
2. Id. art. , § 2, cl. 2.
3. d.
4. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
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questions of sovereign immunity.5 The FSIA "establishes a compre-
hensive framework for determining whether a court... may exercise
jurisdiction over a foreign state."' 6 Unfortunately, the effectiveness of
the FSIA has been hampered by a lack of specific definitions for key
terms, which has led to inconsistent results. For example, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction over an employment
contract between a United States citizen and Iraq7 only a year after
the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia rejected jurisdiction
over a similar contract with Saudi Arabia.8
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court moved toward resolv-
ing these problems with the FSIA.9 In a unanimous decision in Re-
public of Argentina v. Weltover Inc., the Court adopted a definition of
"commercial activity" which appeared to liberally expand subject mat-
ter jurisdiction in sovereign immunity cases.10 This decision promised
not only to settle many of the differences among lower courts, but also
to expand significantly the ability of U.S. courts to hear cases involv-
ing foreign nations.
However, less than a year later in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson," the
Supreme Court seemed to lose its certainty as to the application of the
FSIA. In Nelson, a divided court refused to expand subject matter
jurisdiction to hear a case involving the government of Saudi Arabia."
This Note will analyze Saudi Arabia v. Nelson. It will begin with
a discussion of the key concepts in the Court's determination, and will
then give a brief history of the events and court rulings leading up to
the Nelson decision, including an examination of sovereign immunity
just prior to Nelson as evidenced by the Supreme Court's ruling in
Weltover. In this context, this Note will examine Nelson's relevant
facts and the Court's analysis. Finally, this Note will attempt to pro-
vide possible reasons for the court's ruling.
5. H.R. REP. No. 1487,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6610.
6. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2164 (1992).
7. Brewer v. Socialist People's Republic of Iraq, 890 F.2d 97, 101 (8th Cir. 1989).
8. Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
9. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2160.
10. Id. at 2166. The definition of "commercial activity" lies at the heart of any consid-
eration of sovereign immunity because it is when sovereigns are engaged in "commercial
activity" that they lose their immunity.
11. 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
12. Id.
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II. HISTORY
Historically there have been two types of sovereign immunity: ab-
solute immunity and restrictive immunity.
A. Absolute Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is basically a modem formu-
lation of the historic declaration that "[t]he king can do no wrong."13
By the close of the eighteenth century, the concept that a sovereign
was immune from prosecution or suit was firmly established in the
English courts.14 The doctrine was adopted by the fledgling American
courts along with much of the English common law.
The concept of foreign sovereign immunity was first considered
by the United States Supreme Court in 1812 in The Schooner Ex-
change v. M'Faddon.'5 In M'Faddon, Chief Justice Marshall ruled that
each sovereign had full jurisdiction within its territory except where
jurisdiction was waived over certain activities of foreign sovereigns as
part of foreign relations. 6 Marshall's opinion would come to form the
basis of the "absolute immunity" theory of foreign sovereignimmunity.
Over the next century, M'Faddon was cited by courts facing sov-
ereign defendants. Implicit in Marshall's ruling was the need for the
judiciary to defer to the executive whenever issues concerning foreign
relations arose.'7 Eventually, the M'Faddon holding developed into a
rule prohibiting subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving for-
eign sovereigns."'
B. Restrictive Immunity
The most tangible difference between the "absolute" theory and
the "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity is that, as denoted by
its name, the latter theory does not guarantee sovereigns absolute im-
munity. Rather, the restrictive theory delineates certain categories of
governmental activity that are not granted immunity. If a foreign gov-
13. WaLTAM BLACKSrONE, COMMNTARIES ON TnE LAws OF ENGLAND 366 (William
C. Jones ed., 1916).
14. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Foreign State Immunity In Europe, 5 N.Y. Ir'L L REv. 51,
53 (1992).
15. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
16. Id.
17. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,486 (1983).
18. I1
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ernment engages in these activities it may be required to answer in
court for its actions. 19
Paralleling absolute immunity, the doctrine of restrictive immu-
nity originated in European domestic dealings.20 In the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, as European governments
nationalized railroads and other important industries, it became in-
creasingly difficult to determine whether injured parties should be en-
titled to recover damages in suits against these government-owned
companies or whether sovereign immunity prohibited ;recovery.21 In
response to inevitable tort claims and contractual disputes, European
courts developed a system to impose liability on governments acting
in a "private" capacity while granting them immunity for purely "pub-
lic" activities.2 Like absolute immunity, the doctrine of restrictive
immunity was applied by European governments before it made its
way to the United States. 3
In 1952, in response to the trends in Europe, the United States
State Department issued the "Tate Letter" declaring its adoption of
the restrictive theory of immunity in its dealings with foreign sover-
eign governments.24 Since the U.S. courts routinely deferred to the
State Department on issues of sovereign immunity, the courts effec-
tively adopted the restrictive theory as well?5 Unfortunately, the Tate
Letter failed to enunciate criteria for distinguishing when immunity
should be denied or upheld. The result was confusion and
inconsistency. 26
The lack of consistency eventually led the Supreme Court to
question the effectiveness of the existing system. In Alfied Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,27 the Court expressed skepticism
19. "It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in
any trading company, it devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company,
of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen." Saudi Arabia v, Nelson, 113
S. Ct. at 1483 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of
Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907 (1824)).
20. Dellapenna, supra note 14, at 57.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 58.
23. Id. One of the earliest examples of the application of the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity as applied to domestic governments comes from Chief Justice Mar-
shall's ruling in Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904
(1824).
24. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Acting
Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
25. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487-88 (1983).
26. Id. at 488.
27. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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toward the continuing value of requiring the judiciary to rely on the
executive when determining matters of sovereign immunity. 8 Con-
flicts between the two bodies had developed when potential defendant
nations had used foreign relation pressures to force the State Depart-
ment into granting immunity.?9 This is exactly what happened in Dun-
hill. A sovereign defendant had been granted immunity by the State
Department, but the State Department had failed to issue an execu-
tive opinion on immunity before the judiciary had decided that sover-
eign immunity did not extend to the matter at hand.30
C. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
In 1976, in an attempt to address the lingering inconsistencies in
the system, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA).31 Congress's intention was to give courts more discretion in
determining whether they had subject matter jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns. 32 Under the act, the immunity of foreign governments is
assumed and must be affirmatively disproven for subject matter juris-
diction to exist? 3 The FSIA establishes specific exceptions to the gen-
eral rule of sovereign immunity241 If one of the exceptions applies, the
court must determine whether the sovereign nation has "substantial
contacts" with the United States in order to establish subject matter
jurisdiction.35 Unfortunately, the FSIA's lack of clear definitions has
led to varying interpretations resulting in inconsistencies.
D. The Commercial Activity Exception
The FSIA provides that immunity will not be afforded in any case
"in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state." 36 Known as the commercial
activity exception, this clause provides the primary means by which
parties may bring foreign sovereigns to court.37 Prospective plaintiffs
28. Id. at 715 (Powell, J., concurring).
29. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487.
30. See Dunhi!!, 425 U.S. 682.
31. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988).
32. H.R. REP'. No. 1487, supra note 5, at 12.
33. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
34. Id. § 1605. In Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983), the
Court determined that subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign must be deter-
mined according to the FSIA. Id. at 493-94. If none of the FSIA exceptions apply, there is
no subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
35. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e).
36. Id. § 1605(a)(2).
37. Weltover, 112 S. CL at 2164.
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must establish all the requisite elements of this exception in order to
satisfy subject matter jurisdiction. The lack of clear definitions in the
FSIA has made satisfaction of these elements an area of contention.38
1. Nature Versus Purpose of the Activity
From the inception of the restrictive theory of sovereign immu-
nity, a vital distinction has existed between the public and private ca-
pacities of sovereigns. 9 The FSIA refers to commercial rather than
private activity and requires that the type of activity be "determined
by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular trans-
action or act, rather than by reference to its purpose."40 Congress de-
fined "commercial activity" as "either a regular course of commercial
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act."4 1 As evi-
denced by the Court's decision in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria,42 courts were given significant leeway in drawing the line be-
tween the nature and the purpose of an activity.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover Inc., lower courts had difficulty establishing a consistent
working definition of commercial activity. Courts recognized that the
close relationship and fine distinctions between the nature and pur-
pose of an activity made it difficult to determine which aspects of a
case were relevant for consideration.43 For example, the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals denied immunity where the Spanish govern-
ment was involved in the seemingly public activity of employing a
marketing agent,44 while the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
immunity where the national bank of Nicaragua had committed the
mundane commercial act of stopping payment on a check.45
2. Contacts with the United States
To qualify for subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA, a plain-
tiff must base his cause of action on a commercial activity that has
either been "carried on" or has had a "direct effect" in the United
States.46 The FSIA defines these terms as requiring that an activity
38. Id. at 2165.
39. See Dellapenna, supra note 14.
40. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
41. Id.
42. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
43. Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 835 F.2d 160, 164 (7th Cir. 1987).
44. Id
45. De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
46. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
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have "substantial contacts with the United States."4 7 However, the
legislative history of the FSIA suggests that not only must the contacts
be "substantial," they must also be "foreseeable" to satisfy subject
matter jurisdiction.48
The lower courts split over which standard should be applied: the
milder standard requiring only "substantial" contacts, or the stricter
standard requiring both "substantial" and "foreseeable" contacts.
Prior to the Court's decision in Weltover, the stricter standard seemed
to be gaining prominence. The only sure way to satisfy the FSIA was
to demonstrate that the activity in question had occurred primarily
within the United States.
3. "Based Upon"
The FSIA requires that a prospective plaintiff's cause of action be
"based upon" a qualifying commercial activity.4 9 As with the other
key terms, the lower courts varied dramatically on how this require-
ment should be interpreted. At their most permissive, some courts
held that "based upon" merely required that the foreign sovereign
conduct regular business in the United States.50 On the other hand,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Santos v. Compagnie Nation-
ale Air France ruled that "based upon" was satisfied only if actual ele-
ments of the commercial activity at issue occurred within the United
States.5 '
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Nelson, several courts
had adopted the "nexus" test. This test required a court to direct its
attention to the relationship between the cause of action and the spe-
cific commercial activity, rather than upon any general activity of the
defendant.52 This approach required courts to find connections be-
tween the foreign government's commercial activity and the United
States as well as between the commercial activity and the plaintiff's
cause of action.53
47. Id. § 1603(e).
48. H.R Rm,. No. 1487, supra note 5, at 19.
49. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C § 1605(a)(2).
50. Barnett v. Iberia Air Lines of Spain, 660 F. Supp. 1148, 1151 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
51. 934 F.2d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 1991).
52. Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de
Navigation, 730 F.2d 195, 203 (5th Cir. 1984).
53. Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1380 (5th Cir. 1980).
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E. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover Inc.
In 1992, in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover Inc.,54 the Supreme
Court had the opportunity to address many of the contentious issues
that had arisen under the FSIA. The case arose from tie Argentinean
government's program of insuring securities by guaranteeing ex-
change rates in order to facilitate foreign investment.5 When Argen-
tina attempted to postpone payment of those securities, three non-
U.S. based corporations filed a breach of contract action in a United
States District Court based solely on the fact that New York City had
been named as one of four possible sites for payment of the insur-
ance.5 6 Despite the tenuous nature of this contact with the United
States, both the district and circuit courts ruled in favor of subject
matter jurisdiction. 7 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court
upheld these rulings.58
Belying the seeming complexity of the issue, the Court showed no
hesitation in finding that Argentina's actions qualified as "commercial
activity" under the FSIA.59 Argentina argued strongly that its actions
were public in nature because its government had been motivated by
uniquely public concerns.60 The Court, even while accepting currency
stabilization as a legitimate public purpose, refused to consider the
element of purpose in making its determination. 61 According to the
Court's opinion, whenever "a foreign government acts, not as a regu-
lator of a market, but in the manner of a private player within it, the
foreign sovereign's actions" qualify as "commercial" under the
FSIA.62 The Court looked to the nature of the activity and found that
the nature of issuing securities more closely matched the actions of a
private player than a public regulator.63
Even more dramatic was the ease with which the Court ruled that
Argentina's activities had a "direct effect" in the United States. The
Court dismissed any consideration of "substantial" or "foreseeable"
contacts, considering these concerns baseless and not required by the
54. 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992).
55. Id. at 2163-64.
56. Id. at 2164.
57. I&
58. Id. at 2168.
59. Id. at 2166-68.
60. Id. at 2167.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2166.
63. Id. at 2167.
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FSIA.r Instead, the Court held that the mere possibility that money
might pass through New York as part of this transaction was enough
to satisfy the contact requirement.' s
Although the Weltover decision failed to address the meaning of
"based upon," it still represented the greatest potential expansion of
federal subject matter jurisdiction since the Tate Letter. The unequiv-
ocal wording of the decision and its unanimous support suggested a
Court committed to that expansion.66
1H. SAUDI ARABIA v. NELSON
Considering the dynamic nature of the Weltover decision and the
brief time that elapsed between it and Nelson, the Supreme Court
could have applied Weltover to resolve quickly the questions
presented by Nelson. Yet, the Nelson decision reflects very little of
Weltover. It is neither unanimous nor concise and even its legal un-
derpinnings are different. This section will examine the facts behind
Nelson and the issues the Supreme Court addressed in its opinion.
A. Facts and Case History
In 1983, Scott Nelson responded to a recruitment drive by the
Hospital Corporation of America (HCA).67 HCA was an independ-
ent U.S. corporation under contract with the Saudi Arabian govern-
ment to recruit employees for the King Faisal Specialist Hospital in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.' s Mr. Nelson was interviewed in Saudi Arabia
and later signed an employment contract in Florida.69
Employed as a monitoring systems engineer, Mr. Nelson was re-
sponsible for inspecting equipment and improving safety.70 He began
work in March of 1984, and during the course of his duties he discov-
ered safety hazards which he repeatedly reported to the hospital's offi-
64. Id. at 2168. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia described the concepts as "a bit of
non-sequitur" in the Congressional Record.
65. Id.
66. The potential effect of the Weltover ruling on the lower courts was demonstrated
by Ampac Group, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras. 797 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1992). In
Ampac, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida applied Weltover to uphold
subject matter jurisdiction where the government of Honduras interfered with the sale of
an international business. Id. at 976.
67. Nelson, 113 S. CL at 1474.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1474-75.
70. Id. at 1475.
1995]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
cials over a period of several months.71 He also reported the hazards
to an investigative commission of the Saudi Arabian government. 71
The hospital's officials told him to ignore the hazards.73 On Septem-
ber 27, 1984, Mr. Nelson was arrested by Saudi Arabian agents and
imprisoned. 74 While in jail, Mr. Nelson alleged that he was subjected
to torture and other indignities without due process of law.7" He was
finally released upon the personal request of a United States
Senator.76
Mr. Nelson and his wife filed suit against the Saudi Arabian gov-
ernment in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida.77 His complaint alleged that the hospital and the Saudi
Arabian government had committed various intentional torts.78 Also
included in the complaint was the charge that the defendants negli-
gently failed to warn Mr. Nelson of the dangers inherent in their offer
of employment.79 Nelson's wife based her complaint on derivative in-
juries she sustained from the defendants' actions.8 0
The District Court dismissed the case for failure to establish sub-
ject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA.81 The District Court was not
overly concerned with deciding whether "commercial activities" were
involved.82 Rather, the court focused on the lack of a sufficient nexus
between those activities and the Nelsons' causes of action. 3
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 8'
Despite the involvement of a traditionally public organization, the
Saudi Arabian police, the court of appeals ruled that the Nelsons'
causes of action were sufficiently connected with the commercial ac-
tivities to satisfy the FSIA.85 The court of appeals found that "the
detention and torture of Nelson are so intertwined with his employ-
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1475-76.
79. Id. at 1476.
80. I
81. I
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528, 1536 (11th Cir. 1991).
85. Id.
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ment at the Hospital,... that they are 'based upon' his recruitment
and hiring."
B. The Supreme Court's Ruling
In a considerable departure from its position in Weltover, a di-
vided Court reversed the circuit court of appeals and refused to find
sufficient grounds for exerting subject matter jurisdiction over the
government of Saudi Arabia.' In contrast to Weltover's liberal treat-
ment of "direct effect," the Nelson majority adopted a conservative
interpretation of the "based upon" requirement.88 The majority also
seemed to retreat from the liberal interpretation of "commercial activ-
ity" found in Weltover.8 9 Thus, the Court's true position in this area is
unclear.
1. "Commercial Activity"
The definition of what constitutes "commercial activity" lies at
the heart of any consideration of foreign sovereign immunity. In
Weltover, the Supreme Court expanded the definition of "commercial
activity" to apply to areas previously considered immune from prose-
cution.90 The Court's willingness in Weltover to infringe upon tradi-
tionally public activities blurred the delineation between public
activities which are afforded immunity and private actions which are
not. The majority ruling in Nelson re-establishes definite lines be-
tween the public and private sectors.
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter side-stepped rather than
reversed the Weltover result. Citing Weltover, he used the "nature"
over "purpose" analysis to support his argument that whatever the
motivation behind it, Saudi Arabia's use of its police force to detain
Mr. Nelson was a public act.91 Distinguishing Nelson from Weltover,
Justice Souter argued that whereas Argentina "merely dealt in the
bond market in the manner of a private player,"92 Saudi Arabia was
exercising powers "peculiarly sovereign in nature."93 At the heart of
the majority's ruling is the determination that these (and presumably
86Id.
87. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1481.
88. Id. at 1477-78.
89. Id. at 1478-79.
90. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2166-67.
91. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1479.
92. id
93. Id.
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other) "peculiarly sovereign" powers remain outside the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction provided by the FSIA.
Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens, in a mixture of concur-
rences and dissents, rejected the majority's refusal to include Saudi
Arabia's use of police forces as "commercial activity."94 Justices
Blackmun and White argued that the majority opinion is flawed be-
cause it fails to examine how the police officers were used.95 In an
analogy to repressive labor practices, Justice White suggested that the
Saudi Arabians used governmental police forces against Nelson in the
same way unscrupulous employers use hired hooligans.96 Under this
analysis, any activity taken by a sovereign which could be duplicated
by private citizens is a "commercial activity" open to liability in
United States courts. 7
2. "Based Upon"
The FSIA requires that a plaintiff's cause of action be "based
upon a commercial activity" to qualify for subject matter jurisdic-
tion.98 Under the majority view in Nelson, it is an extremely impor-
tant distinction that some governmental activities are "commercial"
while others are "peculiarly" governmental and thus immune from
suit.99 The activity that serves as the basis for a cause of action could
determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.
In presenting their case, the Nelsons argued that their legal com-
plaints were based on a variety of activities. 1°° Some of these, includ-
ing employee recruitment, were described in the Congressional report
accompanying the FSIA as "commercial activity."10 1 If the Court
could have been convinced to accept these activities as the proper ba-
sis for subject matter jurisdiction, the majority's refusal to find police
activity to be commercial might have been circumvented. The Nel-
sons could have jettisoned any questionable basis and proceeded
purely on legitimate "commercial activities."
Justice Souter and the majority refused to accept the Nelsons' ar-
guments in this area. Dispensing with the nexus text and other estab-
94. Id. at 1481-84, 1487-89.
95. Id. at 1482-83.
96. Id. at 1483.
97. Id.
98. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
99. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1479.
100. Id. at 1475-76.
101. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 5, at 16.
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lished methods of determining whether a cause of action is "based
upon" a certain activity, Justice Souter chose instead to focus on the
definitions of the words.'01 Applying the "natural meaning of the
phrase" the majority concluded that Nelson's recruitment and subse-
quent employment with the hospital were not the basis for Nelson's
actions.10 3 Justice Souter admitted that other activities may have
played an essential role in leading up to Nelson's injuries, but asserted
that only the imprisonment was the actual cause of those injuries.104
Consequently, the Nelsons' case failed to satisfy the test for subject
matter jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns because it was based solely
upon a "peculiarly" public activity immune from suit under the FSIA.
Several of the Justices writing independent opinions disagreed
with the majority on this point."°5 Justices White and Blackmun chose
to apply the nexus and substantial contacts test but agreed with the
majority's holding.c 6 In writing his dissent, Justice Stevens expressed
his agreement with Justice White's results in this area, but failed to
explain which test he favored. 10 7 These opinions suggest that the old
methods of determining what activity a course of action is "based
upon" have been disposed of in favor of Justice Souter's new defini-
tional approach.
3. Failure to Warn
Related to both of the previous issues, Justices Kennedy, Black-
mun, and Stevens specifically disagreed with the majority's refusal to
remand the case for further consideration based on Nelson's claim
that the defendants negligently failed to warn him of the inherent dan-
gers in their employment offer.0 8 Justice Souter dismissed the claim
as "merely a semantic ploy" that if allowed to go forward could seri-
ously weaken the protections afforded foreign sovereigns by the
FSIA.'0 9 Justice Souter argued that "failure to warn" could be used to
recast any claim to circumvent restrictions imposed by the FSIA.1"° In
102. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1477.
103. 1d. at 1477-78.
104. Id at 1478.
105. Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority on this issue but dissented on other
grounds.
106. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1484. Justice White based his concurrence with the majority
on his belief that Nelson's imprisonment lacked sufficient nexus with the United States to
qualify for subject matter jurisdiction.
107. Id at 1488-89.
108. Id. at 1484.
109. Id. at 1480.
110. Id.
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his dissent, Justice Kennedy suggested that Justice Souter's reasons for
rejecting the claim were improper and irrelevant to the situation."'
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, argued
that the failure-to-warn claim fully satisfied the FSIA requirements
established by the majority and should have been allowed to
proceed.' 12
IV. THE POSSIBLE REASONS BEHINI) THE
NELSON DECISION
In a comparison of Weltover and Nelson, there seem to be many
factual similarities. Despite these similarities and the closeness in
time of the two cases, the Court moved from a unanimous position in
favor of expanding subject matter jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns
to a fractious opinion opposing it. Such a dramatic change suggests
the court had good reasons for its shift in position. The Court may
have been motivated by an unresolvable difference of facts, a need to
reassess the effects of Weltover, an opportunity to address a larger ju-
risdictional issue, or simply the recognition of modem political reali-
ties. Unfortunately, the Court failed to explain the motivations
behind its analysis.
A. Distinguishable Facts
Despite the factual similarities between the two cases, and
although the Court itself did not choose to include this distinction in
its analysis, Nelson involves complicated issues not present in
Weltover. Any consideration of the liability of a foreign sovereign for
actions by its police forces would require the court to become em-
broiled in the debate over international human rights. Further, the
necessity of considering trans-border employment rights complicates
the issues. The Supreme Court may have foreseen the complexities of
these issues and decided to dismiss this case to keep United States
courts out of these controversies.
B. Weltover Went Too Far
The majority in Nelson may have decided that the Weltover deci-
sion expanded subject matter jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns too
far and too fast. After Weltover, lower courts applied its holding to
find jurisdiction over otherwise questionable cases. Fol owing the rul-
111. Id. at 1484-87.
112. Id.
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ing in Nelson, a considerable number of lower courts have dismissed
cases for lack of jurisdiction.
Antares Aircraft L.P. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, originally
decided in 1991, provides a perfect example. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction a
case for damages resulting from the impoundment of an airplane in
Nigeria because the case's only connection to the United States was
nominal ownership of the airplane by American citizens. The
Supreme Court vacated the Antares decision following Weltover."14
Upon reconsideration after the Nelson decision, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals again dismissed the case.115 While the majority did
not cite Nelson, Judge Altimari, writing in dissent, cited Weltover as
the major reason why subject matter jurisdiction should have been
upheld."16
C. Reapplication of "Minimum Contacts" Protection
To gain access to United States courts, a plaintiff must establish
not only subject matter jurisdiction but also that the defendant has
sufficient "minimum contacts" to be subject to personal jurisdiction.
When a foreign sovereign is the defendant, the practical requirements
of international relations virtually guarantee that minimum contacts
will be satisfied. The Supreme Court recognized this fact in
Weltover.117 The result is foreign sovereigns are effectively deprived
of the protections usually afforded by the doctrine of personal
jurisdiction.
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,"18 decided in 1987,
a plurality of the Supreme Court held that foreign corporations could
only be subjected to personal jurisdiction if they "purposefully di-
rected" products to the court's forum.'19 As a result, foreign corpo-
rate defendants could only be held liable in U.S. courts if they
knowingly and purposefully chose to expose themselves to that liabil-
113. 948 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992).
114. Id.
115. Antares Aircraft, L.P. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 999 F.2d 33, 36-37 (2d Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. CL 878 (1994).
116. Antares, 999 F.2d at 37.
117. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2169. Justice Scalia asserted that Argentina had "purpose-
fully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the [United States]" by
"issuing negotiable debt instruments denominated in U.S. dollars and payable in New York
and by appointing a financial agent in that city." Id.
118. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
119. Id. at 112.
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ity.12 0 In ruling that certain activities essential to governing a nation
(such as police) are "peculiarly" public in nature and thus not "com-
mercial activities,"' 21 the Nelson majority effectively extended the
protection of Asahi to foreign sovereigns. Significantly, the Nelson
majority represents the remaining members of the Asahi plurality
joined by subsequent appointees to the Court.
Under Nelson, foreign sovereigns like Saudi Arabia will not be
stripped of their immunity for engaging in activities essential to the
day-to-day governing of their nation. Rather, nations will only sacri-
fice their immunity if, like Argentina, they knowingly and purpose-
fully choose to involve themselves in non-essential "commercial
activities."
D. Political Reality
It is noteworthy that in recent years no major ally of the United
States has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court against its will. Certainly, the Supreme Court's
willingness to extend subject matter jurisdiction over Argentina, but
not over Saudi Arabia (particularly, soon after the Gulf War) can not
be entirely coincidental. Responsible courts must recognize that
whatever Congress may have intended to accomplish with the FSIA,
foreign sovereign immunity is integrally linked with foreign diplo-
macy.122 The courts may no longer have to answer to the executive
branch on this issue, but they can ill afford to ignore it either.'2 3
V. CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court issued its decision, a variety of courts
have cited Nelson regarding a diverse assortment of factual situations.
Several circuit courts of appeal have cited the Nelson decision in sup-
port of upholding sovereign immunity in cases ranging from sales to
foreign air forces to the kidnapping of an American citizen by a for-
eign government. 124 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, however,
120. Id. at 109.
121. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1479.
122. Justice Souter cited to State Department practices to support the accuracy of his
analysis. Id. at 1480 n.5.
123. In Pullman Constr. Indus. v. United States, 23 F.3d 1166 (7th Cir. 1994), the Sev-
enth Circuit cited Nelson in support of the assertion that the FSIA was "designed to pro-
mote harmonious international relations." 23 F.3d at 1169.
124. United World Trade v. Mangyshlankneft Oil Prod. Ass'n., 33 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir.
1994) (involving contractual disputes over oil sales from Kazakhstan); Transaero, Inc. v. La
Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (involving breach of a contract by the
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ruled that it had subject matter jurisdiction over a wrongful death ac-
tion against a corporation owned by the Mexican government.225 The
scope of Nelson was broad enough to even merit consideration by the
United States Tax Court.'2
Whatever else it does, the disparity between the decisions in Re-
public of Argentina v. Weltover Ina and Saudi Arabia v. Nelson high-
lights the continuing problems with the FSIA. Enacted in an
atmosphere that favored reducing the power of the executive
branch,2 7 it may represent an ill-considered solution. Certainly, there
is no reason to believe that Nelson represents the Supreme Court's
final word on the matter. It can only be hoped that the next time
Congress addresses this issue, it will take the time to define more com-
pletely its intentions.
Bolivian air force); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (in-
volving a hostage suing his kidnappers for noncommercial torts).
125. Hiroko Sugimoto v. Exportadora De Sal S.A.D.E.CV., 19 F.3d 1309 (9th Cir.
1994).
126. Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1707 (1993) (holding oil-related
transaction with Saudi Arabia was subject to sovereign immunity because the Saudi Ara-
bian government had the power to nationalize the industry).
127. The FSIA was a contemporary of the War Powers Act. Both pieces of legislation
could not have avoided being affected by the power struggle between the legislature and
the executive surrounding the fall of the Nixon Administration.
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